🛡️ Sentinel: [MEDIUM] Fix insecure backup permissions#35
🛡️ Sentinel: [MEDIUM] Fix insecure backup permissions#35
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- Added `umask 077` to `tools/backup-projects.sh` to ensure all created files are private. - Added explicit `chmod 700` to backup directory creation. - Added a regression test `tests/verify_backup_permissions.sh`. - Added a security journal entry in `.jules/sentinel.md`. Co-authored-by: kidchenko <5432753+kidchenko@users.noreply.github.com>
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThis pull request implements secure backup permissions by adding umask 077 and explicit chmod 700 to the backup script, documents the vulnerability in Sentinel's Journal, and introduces tests to verify proper backup archive and directory permissions. Changes
Estimated code review effort🎯 2 (Simple) | ⏱️ ~15 minutes Poem
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🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Actionable comments posted: 1
🧹 Nitpick comments (4)
tests/verify_backup_permissions.sh (3)
2-9:set -ewithout a cleanuptrapleaves temp dirs behind on unexpected failures.Any unhandled non-zero exit between the
mktempand the finalrm -rf "$TEST_DIR"will bypass cleanup.♻️ Add a trap for reliable cleanup
set -e + +# Ensure cleanup on exit (normal or error) +cleanup() { rm -rf "$TEST_DIR"; } +trap cleanup EXITYou can then remove the manual
rm -rf "$TEST_DIR"lines inside the|| { ... }block and the[[ ! -f "$BACKUP_ARCHIVE" ]]block, as the trap handles them automatically.🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed. In `@tests/verify_backup_permissions.sh` around lines 2 - 9, The script sets -e but doesn't register a cleanup trap, so temporary TEST_DIR may be left behind on failures; add a cleanup function (e.g., cleanup()) that does a safe rm -rf "$TEST_DIR" and register it with trap 'cleanup' EXIT (and optionally on ERR INT TERM) after TEST_DIR is created, then remove any manual rm -rf "$TEST_DIR" occurrences in the script and rely on the trap to perform teardown; ensure the trap is installed after TEST_DIR is assigned so the cleanup function can reference it, and keep TEST_DIR, BACKUP_DIR, SOURCE_DIR, CONFIG_FILE variable names unchanged.
51-70: Stat detection logic is correct; minor stdout nit in theelifbranch.The
%Lpformat on BSD/macOS returns numeric octal permissions (e.g.,600), so comparisons against"600"/"400"/"700"are correct on both platforms. One nit: theelif stat --version 2>/dev/null; thenon line 55 does not redirect stdout, so if this branch were ever reached, the version string would be printed to test output. Since this branch is dead code in practice, it's low priority.♻️ Optional fix for the elif stdout
-elif stat --version 2>/dev/null; then +elif stat --version >/dev/null 2>&1; then🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed. In `@tests/verify_backup_permissions.sh` around lines 51 - 70, The elif branch currently uses the test `elif stat --version 2>/dev/null; then` which leaves stdout unredirected and may print the version string; update that conditional to suppress output (e.g., redirect both stdout and stderr) so it closely mirrors the GNU-detection branch, leaving the subsequent assignment to PERMS and DIR_PERMS (the `PERMS=$(stat -c "%a" "$BACKUP_ARCHIVE")` and `DIR_PERMS=$(stat -c "%a" "$BACKUP_DIR")` lines) unchanged.
28-39: Implicityqdependency surfaces as a cryptic "Backup script failed" failure.If
yqis not installed,backup-projects.shsilently falls back to default folders (~/kidchenko,~/lambda3, …), finds none, and exits 1. The test reports failure but only reveals the cause in the captured log — not ideal for CI diagnostics.♻️ Add an explicit pre-check
# Determine repo root REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)" BACKUP_SCRIPT="$REPO_ROOT/tools/backup-projects.sh" + +# Pre-flight: yq is required by backup-projects.sh to read the test config +if ! command -v yq &>/dev/null; then + echo "SKIP: yq is not installed; cannot run backup permission tests." + rm -rf "$TEST_DIR" + exit 0 # or exit 77 if using an autotest framework that understands SKIP +fi echo "Running backup script: $BACKUP_SCRIPT"🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed. In `@tests/verify_backup_permissions.sh` around lines 28 - 39, Add an explicit pre-check for the yasnippet "yq" binary before invoking BACKUP_SCRIPT so CI failures are immediately clear: in tests/verify_backup_permissions.sh, before running bash "$BACKUP_SCRIPT" use a command existence check (e.g., command -v yq or which yq) and if missing write a clear error both to stdout and to "$TEST_DIR/backup.log" and exit 1; reference the existing symbols BACKUP_SCRIPT, CONFIG_FILE and TEST_DIR so the check is colocated with the current backup invocation and produces an actionable message like "yq not found; please install yq" before attempting backup.tools/backup-projects.sh (1)
353-361:chmod 700additions are a good defense-in-depth layer.Since
umask 077already ensures newly created directories start at mode700, thesechmodcalls are primarily valuable for remediating directories that existed before this fix (e.g., previously created at755). No issues.One operational note: pre-existing
*.ziparchives already sitting inBACKUP_TEMP_DIRkeep their original world-readable permissions. A one-time sweep during first run (or documented manual step) may be warranted to bring them in line.🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed. In `@tools/backup-projects.sh` around lines 353 - 361, Keep the chmod 700 calls for BACKUP_TEMP_DIR and LOG_DIR inside the DRY_RUN check (when DRY_RUN != true) and add a one-time remediation sweep that, only when not a dry run, tightens permissions on existing backup archives in BACKUP_TEMP_DIR (e.g., change world-readable zip files to owner-only) so pre-existing *.zip files aren’t left world-readable; reference the DRY_RUN branching around BACKUP_TEMP_DIR, LOG_DIR and the debug path, and perform the sweep only in the non-dry-run branch on first-run or via a documented one-time step.
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
Inline comments:
In @.jules/sentinel.md:
- Around line 3-6: Add a blank line immediately after the "## 2026-02-19 -
Insecure Backup Permissions" heading and reflow the three following sentences so
none exceed 80 characters; specifically edit the paragraph lines describing
Vulnerability, Learning, and Prevention so each logical sentence is wrapped to
<=80 chars (or split into multiple lines) while preserving wording (and keep the
mention of adding `umask 077` and `chmod 700` intact) to satisfy MD022 and
MD013.
---
Nitpick comments:
In `@tests/verify_backup_permissions.sh`:
- Around line 2-9: The script sets -e but doesn't register a cleanup trap, so
temporary TEST_DIR may be left behind on failures; add a cleanup function (e.g.,
cleanup()) that does a safe rm -rf "$TEST_DIR" and register it with trap
'cleanup' EXIT (and optionally on ERR INT TERM) after TEST_DIR is created, then
remove any manual rm -rf "$TEST_DIR" occurrences in the script and rely on the
trap to perform teardown; ensure the trap is installed after TEST_DIR is
assigned so the cleanup function can reference it, and keep TEST_DIR,
BACKUP_DIR, SOURCE_DIR, CONFIG_FILE variable names unchanged.
- Around line 51-70: The elif branch currently uses the test `elif stat
--version 2>/dev/null; then` which leaves stdout unredirected and may print the
version string; update that conditional to suppress output (e.g., redirect both
stdout and stderr) so it closely mirrors the GNU-detection branch, leaving the
subsequent assignment to PERMS and DIR_PERMS (the `PERMS=$(stat -c "%a"
"$BACKUP_ARCHIVE")` and `DIR_PERMS=$(stat -c "%a" "$BACKUP_DIR")` lines)
unchanged.
- Around line 28-39: Add an explicit pre-check for the yasnippet "yq" binary
before invoking BACKUP_SCRIPT so CI failures are immediately clear: in
tests/verify_backup_permissions.sh, before running bash "$BACKUP_SCRIPT" use a
command existence check (e.g., command -v yq or which yq) and if missing write a
clear error both to stdout and to "$TEST_DIR/backup.log" and exit 1; reference
the existing symbols BACKUP_SCRIPT, CONFIG_FILE and TEST_DIR so the check is
colocated with the current backup invocation and produces an actionable message
like "yq not found; please install yq" before attempting backup.
In `@tools/backup-projects.sh`:
- Around line 353-361: Keep the chmod 700 calls for BACKUP_TEMP_DIR and LOG_DIR
inside the DRY_RUN check (when DRY_RUN != true) and add a one-time remediation
sweep that, only when not a dry run, tightens permissions on existing backup
archives in BACKUP_TEMP_DIR (e.g., change world-readable zip files to
owner-only) so pre-existing *.zip files aren’t left world-readable; reference
the DRY_RUN branching around BACKUP_TEMP_DIR, LOG_DIR and the debug path, and
perform the sweep only in the non-dry-run branch on first-run or via a
documented one-time step.
| ## 2026-02-19 - Insecure Backup Permissions | ||
| **Vulnerability:** Backup archives containing sensitive project data were created with default `umask` (often 022), making them readable by other users on the system (`-rw-rw-r--`). | ||
| **Learning:** Even in single-user systems, assuming default permissions are secure is risky. Tools creating sensitive artifacts must explicitly enforce restrictive permissions. | ||
| **Prevention:** Added `umask 077` to `tools/backup-projects.sh` and explicitly `chmod 700` on backup directories to ensure least privilege. |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Markdown violations are failing CI — fix before merge.
The Lint Documentation check reports two classes of failures:
- MD022: no blank line after the
##heading (line 3) - MD013: lines 4–6 each exceed the 80-character limit
📝 Proposed fix
# Sentinel's Journal
## 2026-02-19 - Insecure Backup Permissions
+
-**Vulnerability:** Backup archives containing sensitive project data were created with default `umask` (often 022), making them readable by other users on the system (`-rw-rw-r--`).
-**Learning:** Even in single-user systems, assuming default permissions are secure is risky. Tools creating sensitive artifacts must explicitly enforce restrictive permissions.
-**Prevention:** Added `umask 077` to `tools/backup-projects.sh` and explicitly `chmod 700` on backup directories to ensure least privilege.
+**Vulnerability:** Backup archives containing sensitive project data were created with
+default `umask` (often 022), making them readable by other users (`-rw-rw-r--`).
+
+**Learning:** Even in single-user systems, assuming default permissions are secure is
+risky. Tools creating sensitive artifacts must explicitly enforce restrictive permissions.
+
+**Prevention:** Added `umask 077` to `tools/backup-projects.sh` and explicitly
+`chmod 700` on backup directories to ensure least privilege.📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| ## 2026-02-19 - Insecure Backup Permissions | |
| **Vulnerability:** Backup archives containing sensitive project data were created with default `umask` (often 022), making them readable by other users on the system (`-rw-rw-r--`). | |
| **Learning:** Even in single-user systems, assuming default permissions are secure is risky. Tools creating sensitive artifacts must explicitly enforce restrictive permissions. | |
| **Prevention:** Added `umask 077` to `tools/backup-projects.sh` and explicitly `chmod 700` on backup directories to ensure least privilege. | |
| ## 2026-02-19 - Insecure Backup Permissions | |
| **Vulnerability:** Backup archives containing sensitive project data were created with | |
| default `umask` (often 022), making them readable by other users (`-rw-rw-r--`). | |
| **Learning:** Even in single-user systems, assuming default permissions are secure is | |
| risky. Tools creating sensitive artifacts must explicitly enforce restrictive permissions. | |
| **Prevention:** Added `umask 077` to `tools/backup-projects.sh` and explicitly | |
| `chmod 700` on backup directories to ensure least privilege. |
🧰 Tools
🪛 GitHub Check: Lint Documentation
[failure] 6-6: Line length
.jules/sentinel.md:6:81 MD013/line-length Line length [Expected: 80; Actual: 139] https://github.com/DavidAnson/markdownlint/blob/v0.34.0/doc/md013.md
[failure] 5-5: Line length
.jules/sentinel.md:5:81 MD013/line-length Line length [Expected: 80; Actual: 176] https://github.com/DavidAnson/markdownlint/blob/v0.34.0/doc/md013.md
[failure] 4-4: Line length
.jules/sentinel.md:4:81 MD013/line-length Line length [Expected: 80; Actual: 181] https://github.com/DavidAnson/markdownlint/blob/v0.34.0/doc/md013.md
[failure] 3-3: Headings should be surrounded by blank lines
.jules/sentinel.md:3 MD022/blanks-around-headings Headings should be surrounded by blank lines [Expected: 1; Actual: 0; Below] [Context: "## 2026-02-19 - Insecure Backup Permissions"] https://github.com/DavidAnson/markdownlint/blob/v0.34.0/doc/md022.md
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In @.jules/sentinel.md around lines 3 - 6, Add a blank line immediately after
the "## 2026-02-19 - Insecure Backup Permissions" heading and reflow the three
following sentences so none exceed 80 characters; specifically edit the
paragraph lines describing Vulnerability, Learning, and Prevention so each
logical sentence is wrapped to <=80 chars (or split into multiple lines) while
preserving wording (and keep the mention of adding `umask 077` and `chmod 700`
intact) to satisfy MD022 and MD013.
🛡️ Sentinel: [MEDIUM] Fix insecure backup permissions
🚨 Severity: MEDIUM
💡 Vulnerability: Backup archives containing potentially sensitive project data were created with default
umask(often 022), making them readable by other users on the system (-rw-rw-r--).🎯 Impact: Local users could access sensitive source code or configurations in the backups.
🔧 Fix: Enforced
umask 077intools/backup-projects.shand added explicitchmod 700to directory creation.✅ Verification: Added
tests/verify_backup_permissions.shwhich simulates a backup and verifies that the resulting archive and directory have secure permissions (600/700).PR created automatically by Jules for task 17270946599550979523 started by @kidchenko
Summary by CodeRabbit
Bug Fixes
Tests